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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/05/2006 Accident number: 138 
Accident time: 11:20 Accident Date: 23/09/1997 




Primary cause: Unavoidable (?) Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 30/09/1997 
ID original source: SB Name of source: MAG 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: hard 
rocks/stones 
Date record created: 13/02/2004 Date  last modified: 13/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate equipment (?) 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
 
Accident report 
The demining group was operating a three-man team with a two-man drill at the time of the 
accident. One man used the detector, marked any readings, and another man came forward 
to excavate the reading, feel for tripwires and cut any undergrowth. A third man at any one 
1 
time was resting. The demining group issued full body protection and their drills assumed the 
deminer would lie prone while excavating. 
An internal report was made available by the demining group. The following summarises its 
content.  
The accident area was undulating and steep with dry earth and rock. The team had found 
"many" PMNs in the area prior to the accident. The deminer was clearing a safe-lane and was 
using a prodder to inspect a reading when a PMN exploded at 11:20. He suffered minor blast 
injuries to his neck and chin as well as small injuries to both hands in the dorsal area and his 
right shoulder. His visor and helmet took most of the blast. The victim walked out of the 
accident area and was taken to the Emergency hospital in Sulymania along with two 
deminers with the same blood group. The ambulance broke down so the victim was 
transferred to the other vehicle in the convoy. 
Another deminer said that he was kneeling on both knees at the time of the accident.  
The victim said that he started prodding 15cm from the centre of the reading. The ground was 
very hard and as he pushed the prodder it slipped forward and initiated the mine. 
The demining group appointed an internal "Investigating Specialist"  to write a report on the 
accident. His report records that the casualty arrived at hospital at 12:45.  
On visiting the site the investigator found that the safe lane markings were confusing and did 
not conform to SOPs. The ground was loose and crumbly on the surface but very hard 
underneath. He found the prodder, which was badly bent and 4 inches were missing from the 
end. He calculated from the crater that the mine was laid to a depth of 5cm. 
 
Conclusion 
The victim had been wearing a locally made ballistic jacket which had provided insufficient 
protection to the shoulders, but the investigator concluded that the victim's helmet and visor 
saved had him from serious injury. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigator recommended that deminers should be re-instructed about marking systems. 
That the ground should be softened with water, the ambulance should be checked regularly 
and the jackets should be inspected and strengthened where necessary. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 178 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 1 hour 25 minutes 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Helmet 
Short visor 
Protection used: Frag jacket, Helmet, 
Short visor 
 








See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
No formal medical report was made available. In the other documents the injuries were 
described as "blast and fragment injuries to anterior neck and chin, right shoulder and small 
fragment damage to both hands in dorsal area.  IV fluid was given (normal saline) and 500mg 
of Ampicillin.” 
The victim's time off work was recorded as ten days.  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as "Unavoidable" because the victim appears to 
have been working properly when the accident occurred.  
The demining group's SOPs usually require deminers to work prone and the victim was not 
doing so, but there seems to have been a variation of SOP for Iraq allowing deminers to 
excavate in a kneeling position. 
The short visor (attached to a helmet) issued by this demining group may have allowed the 
victim to sustain chin/throat injuries. The gap between a collar and the visor can be wide, 
especially when the helmet is tipped back on the head and the visor standing well away from 
the face. Alternatively, the visor may have been raised. In either case the protection was 
inadequate. The investigator's concern about the standard of the frag-jacket implies that it 
may also have been inadequate. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment”. 
The demining group's management was concerned to make a thorough investigation and 
brought in an "objective" and critical observer to make the investigation. This resulted in an 
unusually informative internal report.  
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